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Abstract
Motivated by recent research on combinatorial markets with endowed valuations by (Babaioff
et al., EC 2018) and (Ezra et al., EC 2020), we introduce a notion of perturbation stability in
Combinatorial Auctions (CAs) and study the extend to which stability helps in social welfare
maximization and mechanism design. A CA is γ-stable if the optimal solution is resilient to
inflation, by a factor of γ ≥ 1, of any bidder’s valuation for any single item. On the positive side,
we show how to compute efficiently an optimal allocation for 2-stable subadditive valuations and
that a Walrasian equilibrium exists for 2-stable submodular valuations. Moreover, we show that
a Parallel 2nd Price Auction (P2A) followed by a demand query for each bidder is truthful
for general subadditive valuations and results in the optimal allocation for 2-stable submodular
valuations. To highlight the challenges behind optimization and mechanism design for stable
CAs, we show that a Walrasian equilibrium may not exist for γ-stable XOS valuations for any
γ, that a polynomial-time approximation scheme does not exist for (2 − ε)-stable submodular
valuations, and that any DSIC mechanism that computes the optimal allocation for stable CAs
and does not use demand queries must use exponentially many value queries. We conclude with
analyzing the Price of Anarchy of P2A and Parallel 1st Price Auctions (P1A) for CAs with
stable submodular and XOS valuations. Our results indicate that the quality of equilibria of
simple non-truthful auctions improves only for γ-stable instances with γ ≥ 3.
Keywords: Combinatorial Auctions, Perturbation Stability, Submodular Valuations, Price of
Anarchy
1 Introduction
Combinatorial auctions appear in many different contexts (e.g., spectrum auctions [25], network
routing auctions [21], airport time-slot auctions [28], etc.) and have been studied extensively (and
virtually from every possible aspect) for a few decades (see e.g., [27] and the references therein).
In a combinatorial auction, a set M of m items (or goods) is to be allocated to n bidders. Each
bidder i has a valuation function vi : 2
M → R≥0 that assigns a non-negative value vi(S) to any
S ⊆ M and quantifies i’s preferences over item subsets. Valuation functions are assumed to be
non-decreasing (free disposal), i.e., vi(S) ≥ vi(S
′), for all S′ ⊆ S, and normalized, i.e., v(∅) = 0.
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The goal is to compute a partitioning (a.k.a. allocation ) S = (S1, . . . , Sn) of M that maximizes
the social welfare sw(S) =
∑n
i=1 vi(Si).
Most of the previous work has focused on CAs with either submodular (and XOS) or complement-
free valuations. A set function v : 2M → R≥0 is submodular if for all S, T ⊆ M , v(S) + v(T ) ≥
v(S∩T )+v(S∪T ), and subadditive (a.k.a. complement-free ) if v(S)+v(T ) ≥ v(S∪T ). A set func-
tion v is XOS (a.k.a. fractionally subadditive, see [17]) if there are additive functions wk : 2
M → R≥0
such that for every S ⊆ M , v(S) = maxk{wk(S)}. The class of submodular functions is a proper
subset of the class of XOS functions, which in turn is a proper subset of subadditive functions.
Since bidder valuations have exponential size in m, algorithmic efficiency requires that the
bidders communicate their preferences through either value or demand queries. A value query
specifies a bidder i and a set (or bundle) S ⊆ M and receives its value vi(S). A demand query
specifies a bidder i, a set T of available items and a price pj for each available item j ∈ T , and
receives a bundle S ⊆ T that maximizes i’s utility vi(S)−
∑
j∈S pj from the set of available items at
these prices. Demand queries are strictly more powerful than value queries, in the sense that value
queries can be simulated by polynomially many demand queries, and in terms of communication
cost, demand queries are exponentially stronger than value queries [7].
The approximability of social welfare maximization by polynomial-time algorithms and truthful
mechanisms for CAs with submodular and subadditive bidders has been extensively studied by the
communities of Approximation Algorithms and Algorithmic Mechanism Design in the last two
decades and are practically well understood (see e.g., Section 1.3 for a selective list of references
most relevant to our work).
1.1 Perturbation Stability in Combinatorial Auctions
Motivated by recent work on beyond worst-case analysis of algorithms [30, 31] and on endowed val-
uations for combinatorial markets [4, 16], in this work, we investigate whether strong performance
guarantees for social welfare maximization (by polynomial-time algorithms and truthful mecha-
nisms, or even at the equilibrium of simple auctions) can be achieved for a very restricted (though
still natural) class of CAs with perturbation stable valuations, where the optimal solution is resilient
to a small increase of any bidder’s valuation for any single item.
From a bird’s view, we follow the approach of beyond worst-case analysis (see e.g., [31, 30]),
where we seek a theoretical understanding of the superior practical performance of certain algo-
rithms by formally analyzing them on practically relevant instances. Hence, researchers restrict
their attention to instances that satisfy certain application-area-specific assumptions, which are
likely to be satisfied in practice. Such assumptions may be of stochastic (e.g., smoothed analysis
of Simplex and local search [34, 35, 15]) or deterministic nature (e.g., perturbation stability in
clustering [1, 3, 5, 6]).
The beyond worst-case approach is not anything new for (Algorithmic) Mechanism Design.
Bayesian analysis, where the bidder valuations are drawn as independent samples from an arbitrary
distribution known to the mechanism, is standard in revenue maximization [33] and has led to many
strong and elegant results for social welfare maximization by truthful posted price mechanisms (see
e.g., [19, 14]). However, in this work, we significantly deviate from Bayesian analysis, where the
mechanism has a relatively accurate knowledge of the distribution of bidder valuations. Instead,
we suggest a deterministic restriction on the class of instances (namely, perturbation stability) and
investigate if there is a natural class of mechanisms (e.g., P2A) that are incentive-compatible and
achieve optimality for CAs with stable submodular valuations.
Our focus on perturbation stable valuations was actually motivated by the recent work of
Babaioff et al. [4] and Ezra et al. [16] on combinatorial markets where the valuations exhibit the
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endowment effect. The endowment effect was proposed by the Nobel Laureate Richard Thaler [37]
to explain situations where owning a bundle of items causes its value to increase. Babaioff et al. [4]
defined that if an allocation S = (S1, . . . , Sn) is α-endowed, for some α > 1, in a CA with bidder
valuations (v1, . . . , vn), then the valuation function of each bidder i becomes
v′i(T ) = vi(T ) + (α− 1)vi(Si ∩ T ) , (1)
for all item sets T ⊆M . Roughly speaking, the value of Si (and its subsets) is inflated by a factor
of α due to the endowment effect. The main result of [4] is that for any combinatorial market
with submodular valuations (v1, . . . , vn), any locally optimal allocation S and any α ≥ 2, the
market with α-endowed valuations (v′1, . . . , v
′
n) for S admits a Walrasian equilibrium (see Section 2
for the definition) where each bidder i receives Si. In simple words, social welfare maximization
in combinatorial markets with endowed valuations (v′1, . . . , v
′
n) is polynomially solvable and the
optimal allocation is supported by item prices. Subsequently, Ezra et al. [16] presented a general
framework for endowed valuations and extended the above result to XOS valuations and general
valuations, for a sufficiently large endowment (see also previous work on bundling equilibrium and
conditional equilibrium [12, 20]).
Inflated valuations due to the endowment effect naturally occur in auctions that take place
regularly over time. Imagine auctions for e.g., season tickets of an athletic club, spots in a parking
lot, reserving timeslots for airport gates, vacation packages at resorts, etc., where regular partici-
pants tend to value more the bundles allocated to them in the past, due to the endowment effect
(see also [37] for more examples). Given the strong positive results of [4, 16], a natural question is
whether CAs with valuations inflated due to the endowment effect allow for stronger approximation
guarantees in social welfare maximization and mechanism design.
Stable Combinatorial Auctions. To investigate the question above, we adopt a slightly stronger
condition on valuation profiles, namely perturbation stability, which is inspired by (and bears a
resemblance to) the definition of perturbation stable clustering instances (see e.g., [1, 3, 5, 6]).
Definition 1. For a constant γ ≥ 1, a γ-perturbation of a valuations profile ~v = (v1, . . . , vn) on a
bidder i and an item j is a new valuations profile ~v′ = (v′1, . . . , v
′
n), where v
′
k = vk for all bidders
k 6= i, and for all S ⊆M ,
v′i(S) = vi(S) + (γ − 1)vi(S ∩ {j}) (2)
A CA with valuations ~v = (v1, . . . , vn) is γ-perturbation stable (or γ-stable) if the optimal allocation
for ~v is unique and remains unique for all γ-perturbations ~v′ of ~v.
Example 1. Let Alice and Bob compete for 2 items, a and b, and have valuations vA({a}) =
vA({a, b}) = 2 and vA({b}) = 1, and vB({b}) = vB({a, b}) = 2 and vB({a}) = 1. The (unique)
optimal allocation is to give a to Alice and b to Bob, with social welfare 4. A perturbation with
most potential to change the optimal solution is to inflate Alice’s value of b by γ ≥ 1. Then, we
get v′A({a}) = 2, v
′
A({b}) = γ and v
′
A({a, b}) = 1+ γ. The optimal solution remains unique for any
γ < 3. Hence the above CA is (3− ε)-stable, for any ε > 0. 
At the conceptual level, we feel that the condition of γ-stability is easier to grasp and to think
about in the context of mechanism design for CAs (compared against considering valuation profiles
~v resulting from the α-endowment of an optimal solution to an initial valuations profile ~x)1. From
an algorithmic and mechanism design viewpoint, we remark that for any γ ≥ 2, CAs with γ-stable
submodular valuations can be treated (to a certain extent) as multi-item auctions with additive
bidders. In fact, this is the technical intuition behind several of our positive results.
1For a better understanding of the two conditions at a technical level, we note that a (technically very useful)
necessary condition for a valuations profile ~v to be γ-stable is that for the optimal allocation (O1, . . . , On), any bidders
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1.2 Contributions
We focus on deterministic algorithms and mechanisms. We first show that a simple greedy algorithm
(Algorithm 1) that allocates each item j to the bidder i with maximum vi({j}) finds the optimal
allocation for CAs with 2-stable subadditive valuations (Theorem 1). Moreover, similarly to [4], we
show that for 2-stable submodular valuations, combining the optimal allocation with a second price
approach, where each item j gets a price of pj = maxk 6=i vk({j}), results in a Walrasian equilibrium
(Theorem 3).
On the negative side, we prove that our positive results above cannot be significantly strength-
ened. We first show that there is a simple (2 − ε)-stable CA with submodular bidders where
approximating the social welfare within any factor larger than 1 − 12k requires at least
(m
k
)
value
queries, for any integer k ≥ 1 (Theorem 2). Thus, a polynomial-time approximation scheme does
not exist for (2 − ε)-submodular valuations. Moreover, we show that for any γ ≥ 1, there is
a γ-stable CA with a XOS bidder and a unit demand bidder that does not admit a Walrasian
equilibrium (Lemma 2).
On the mechanism design part, in a nutshell, we show that (possibly appropriately modified)
Parallel 2nd Price Auctions (P2A) behave very well for stable CAs. We should highlight that
despite the fact that maximizing the social welfare for 2-stable subadditive CAs is easy, VCG is
not an option for the design of computationally efficient incentive compatible mechanisms. The
reason is that removing a single bidder from a 2-stable CA may result in an NP-hard (and hard to
approximate) (sub)instance.
In Section 5, we show that a P2A followed by a demand query for each bidder is dominant
strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) for all CAs with subadditive bidders and maximizes the
social welfare if the valuations profile is submodular and 2-stable (Theorem 4). If demand queries
are not available, the mechanism boils down to a simple P2A. We show that P2A is ex-post
incentive compatible (EPIC) for 2-stable submodular valuations and that truthful bidding leads to
the optimal allocation.
On the negative side and rather surprisingly, we show that demand queries are indeed necessary
for computationally efficient mechanisms that are DSIC for all submodular valuations and maxi-
mize the social welfare if the instance is γ-stable (even if γ is arbitrarily large, Theorem 6). Our
construction is an insightful adaptation of the elegant lower bound in [10, Theorem 1] to the case of
stable submodular valuations. We show that any DSIC mechanism that computes the optimal allo-
cation for stable CAs and does not use demand queries must use exponentially many value queries.
The crux of the proof is that in certain instances, the bidders may find profitable to misreport and
switch from a non-stable instance to a stable one.
In Section 6, we analyze the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of P2A and Parallel 1st Price Auctions
(P1A). Our results demonstrate that the quality of equilibria of simple non-truthful auctions im-
proves only for γ-stable valuations, with γ ≥ 3. We show that the PoA of P2A for CAs with 3-stable
i 6= k and any item j ∈ Oi,
vi(Oi)− vi(Oi \ {j}) > vk(Ok ∪ {j}) − vk(Ok) + (γ − 1)vk({j}) ≥ (γ − 1)vk({j}) .
For this condition, we use (local) optimality of (O1, . . . , On) for both ~v and its γ-perturbation on bidder k and item
j (see also Lemma 1).
A similar (technically useful) condition satisfied by any valuations profile ~v that has resulted from the α-endowment
of an optimal (or locally optimal) solution (O1, . . . , On) to an initial valuations profile ~x is that for any bidders i 6= k
and any item j ∈ Oi,
vi(Oi)− vi(Oi \ {j}) ≥ α
(
vk(Ok ∪ {j}) − vk(Ok)
)
.
For this condition, we use local optimality of (O1, . . . , On) for ~x, multiply the resulting inequality by α, and observe
that vi(Oi)− vi(Oi \ {j}) = α
(
xi(Oi)− xi(Oi \ {j})
)
and that vk(Ok ∪ {j}) − vk(Ok) = xk(Ok ∪ {j}) − xk(Ok).
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submodular valuations is 1 (Theorem 7), while there are (3− ε)-stable CAs with PoA equal to 1/2
(Lemma 3), which matches the PoA for CAs with general submodular valuations (see e.g., [32]).
Moreover, we show that the PoA of both P2A and P1A for CAs with γ-stable XOS valuations is
at least γ−2γ−1 , for any γ ≥ 2 (Theorem 8 and Theorem 9).
1.3 Previous Work
Social welfare maximization with submodular and subadditive valuations has been studied exten-
sively. Submodular Welfare Maximization (SMOD-WM) is known to be (1 − 1/e)-approximable
with polynomially many value queries [38] and (1 − 1/e + ε)-approximable, for a fixed constant
ε > 0, with polynomially many demand queries [18]. Moreover, a simple and natural greedy al-
gorithm achieves an approximation ratio of 1/2 using only value queries [24]. The results about
polynomial-time approximability with value queries are best possible, in the sense that approximat-
ing SMOD-WM within a factor of 1− 1/e+ ε, for any constant ε > 0, is NP-hard [22] and requires
exponentially many value queries [26]. Furthermore, there is a constant ε > 0, such that approx-
imating SMOD-WM within a factor of 1 − ε with demand queries is NP-hard [18]. Subadditive
Welfare Maximization (SADD-WM) is m−1/2-approximable with polynomially many value queries
(and this is best possible [26]) and 1/2-approximable with polynomially many demand queries [17].
Truthful maximization of social welfare in CAs with submodular (or XOS) bidders has been
a central problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design. In the worst-case setting, where we do not
make any further assumptions on bidder valuations, Dobzinski et al. [13] presented the first truthful
mechanism that uses polynomially many demand queries and achieves a non-trivial approximation
guarantee of O((logm)−2). Dobzinski [9] improved the approximation ratio to O( 1logm log logm )
for the more general class of subadditive valuations. Subsequently, Krysta and Vo¨cking [23] pro-
vided an elegant randomized online mechanism with an approximation ratio of O( 1logm) for XOS
valuations. Dobzinski [11] broke the logarithmic barrier for XOS valuations, by showing an approx-
imation guarantee of O((logm)−1/2), which was recently improved to O((log logm)−3) by Assadi
and Singla [2]. Accessing valuations through demand queries is essential for these strong posi-
tive results. Dobzinski [10] proved that any truthful mechanism for CAs with submodular bidders
with approximation ratio better than m−
1
2
+ε must use exponentially many value queries. Truthful
Θ(m−1/2)-approximate mechanisms that use polynomially many value queries are known even for
the more general class of subadditive valuations (see e.g., [13]).
In the Bayesian setting, Feldman et al. [19] showed how to obtain item prices that provide a
constant approximation ratio for XOS valuations. These results were significantly extended and
strengthened by Du¨etting et al. [14].
Previous work has also shown strong Price of Anarchy (PoA) guarantees for CAs with submod-
ular, XOS and subadditive bidders that can be achieved by simple (non-truthful) auctions, such as
P2A and P1A (see e.g., [8, 36, 32, 29]).
Our notion of perturbation stability for CAs is inspired by conceptually similar notions of
perturbation stability in clustering [3, 6]. Angelidakis et al. [1] presented a polynomial-time
algorithm for 2-stable clustering instances with center-based objectives (e.g., k-median, k-means,
k-center), while Balcan et al. [5] proved that there is no polynomial-time algorithm for (2−ε)-stable
instances of k-center, unless NP = RP. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that the
notion of perturbation stability has been applied to social welfare maximization and to algorithmic
mechanism design for Combinatorial Auctions.
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2 Notation and Preliminaries
The key notion of γ-perturbation stability (Definition 1) and a significant part of the terminol-
ogy and the notation are introduced in Section 1. In this section, we introduce some additional
terminology, notation and conventions used in the technical part.
We always let O = (O1, . . . , On) denote the optimal allocation for the instance at hand, and
let Oi be the bundle of bidder i in O. For convenience, we usually let an index j also denote the
singleton set {j} (we write vi(j), vi(S∪j), vi(S \j), etc., instead of vi({j}), vi(S∪{j}), vi(S \{j})).
We use both S1 \ S2 and S1 − S2 for the set difference. We denote the marginal contribution of a
bundle S wrt. T as v(S|T ) = v(S ∪ T )− v(T ).
In addition to submodular, XOS, and subadditive valuations, we consider the classed of additive
and unit-demand valuations v : 2M → R≥0, where there exist b1, . . . , bm ∈ R≥0, such that for any
S ⊆ M , v(S) =
∑
j∈S bj and v(S) = maxj∈S bj , respectively. A useful property of an XOS
valuation v is that for any S ⊆ M , there is an additive valuation q that supports S, in the sense
that v(S) = q(S) and for any T ⊆M , v(T ) ≥ q(T ).
We focus on deterministic algorithms and mechanisms and consider bidders with quasi-linear
utilities, where the utility of bidder i with valuation vi for a bundle S at price p(S) is ui(S) =
vi(S) − p(S). For a price vector (p1, . . . , pm), we often let p(S) =
∑
j∈S pj denote the price of a
bundle S ⊆M .
An allocation S = (S1, . . . , Sn) and a price vector (p1, . . . , pm) form a Walrasian Equilibrium if
all items j with pj > 0 are allocated and each bidder i gets a utility maximizing bundle (or, his
demand) in S, i.e., ∀S ⊆M , vi(Si)− p(Si) ≥ vi(S)− p(S).
A mechanism is dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) (or truthful) if for any valuations
profile ~v, answering (value or demand) queries truthfully is a dominant strategy and guarantees
non-negative utility for all bidders. A mechanism is called ex-post incentive compatible (EPIC) if
truthful bidding is an ex-post Nash equilibrium and guarantees non-negative utility for all bidders.
Let ~D = (D1, ...,Dn) be a profile of distributions over valuation functions (i.e., over possible
bids). In a mechanism with allocation rule ~S(·) = (S1(·), . . . , Sn(·)) and item pricing rule ~p =
(p1(·), . . . , pm(·)), ~D forms a Mixed Nash Equilibrium (MNE), if no bidder has an incentive to
unilaterally deviate from ~D, i.e., for any bidder i and any distribution D′i over valuation functions,
E
~b∼ ~D

vi(Si(~b))−
∑
j∈Si(~b)
pj(~b)

 ≥ E
~b∼(D′
i
, ~D−i)

vi(Si(~b))−
∑
j∈Si(~b)
pj(~b)


If instead of distributions over valuation functions, we restrict each Di andD
′
i to valuation functions
(i.e., to pure strategies over possible bids), we get the definition of a Pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE).
In Section 6, we consider the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of Parallel 2nd Price Auctions (P2A)
and Parallel 1st Price Auctions (P1A). In a Combinatorial Auction, the PoA of a mechanism is
the ratio of (resp. expected) social welfare at the worst Pure (resp. Mixed) Nash Equilibrium to
the social welfare of the optimal allocation. Formally, focusing on the more general case of Mixed
Nash Equilibria:
PoA = min
~D is a MNE
E~b∼ ~D
[∑
i vi(Si(
~b))
]
∑
i vi(Oi)
Properties of Stable Valuations. The following shows a technically useful property of γ-stable
CAs (see also Footnote 1).
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Algorithm 1: Algorithm for 2-Stable Subadditive Valuations
Input: Value query access to subadditive valuations v1(·), ..., vn(·)
Set O1 = O2 = ... = On = ∅
for j ∈M do
Let i be the bidder that maximizes vi(j), and set Oi ← Oi ∪ {j}.
return Allocation (O1, ...On)
Lemma 1 (Valuation Stability). Let ~v be γ-stable and subadditive valuations. Then, for all bidders
i 6= k and all items j ∈ Oi
vi(j) ≥ vi(Oi)− vi(Oi \ j) > (γ − 1)vk(j)
Proof. Fix a bidder i, an item j ∈ Oi and another bidder k 6= i. Since the valuations are γ-stable,
the optimal allocation remains unique and optimal, even if we inflate k’s value for item j by γ.
Such a γ-perturbation of vk results in v
′
k(Ok) = vk(Ok) and v
′
k(Ok ∪ j) = vk(Ok ∪ j)+ (γ − 1)vk(j).
Using the optimality of the allocation (O1, . . . , On) after the perturbation, we obtain that:
vi(Oi)− vi(Oi \ j) > v
′
k(Ok ∪ j) − vk(Ok) = vk(Ok ∪ j)− vk(Ok) + (γ − 1)vk(j)
Using that vk is non-decreasing concludes the proof of the lemma. 
3 Social Welfare Maximization for Stable Valuations
We next consider the problem of social welfare maximization for 2-stable CAs. We first show that
for 2-stable subadditive valuations, we can compute the optimal solution with value queries in
polynomial time.
Theorem 1. Let ~v be a 2-stable subadditive valuations profile. Then Algorithm 1 outputs the
optimal allocation (O1, ..., On) using nm value queries.
Proof. The number of value queries follows directly from the description of the algorithm. As for
optimality, we fix an item j and let i be the bidder that gets j in the optimal solution. Because of
Lemma 1 and the fact that ~v is 2-stable, we know that vi(j) > vk(j), for any other bidder k 6= i.
Because Algorithm 1 allocates j to the bidder with the highest singleton value, i gets item j in the
allocation of Algorithm 1. 
On the negative side, we next show that a polynomial-time approximation scheme does not
exist even for (2− ε)-stable submodular valuations.
Theorem 2. For any ε > 0, there exists a submodular (2− ε)-stable valuations profile ~v such that
for any integer k ≥ 1, approximating the optimal allocation in ~v within any factor larger than 1− 12k
requires at least
(
m
k
)
value queries.
Proof. Given a set O ⊆M we define the following class of valuations:
vO(S) =


|S|, if |S| ≤ |O| − 1
|O| − 1/2, if |S| = |O| and S 6= O
|O|, otherwise (S = O or S ≥ |O|+ 1)
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We first prove that the above valuation is submodular for any O. To do that we examine the
value of vO(S ∪ j)− vO(S), given that j /∈ S:
vO(S ∪ j) − vO(S) =


1, if |S| ≤ |O| − 2
1/2 or 1, if |S| = |O| − 1
0 or 1/2, if |S| = |O|
0, if |S| ≥ |O|+ 1
This entails that for any sets S, T , where |S| ≤ |T |, it holds that vO(S|j) ≥ vO(T |j). This proves
the submodularity, for any O ⊆M .
Now we note that given a valuation vO(·) and value query access to it, finding the bundle O
requires at least
(
m
|O|
)
−1 value queries: Let O′ be such that |O| = |O′|. Observe that the valuations
vO and v
′
O differ only in their value for O and O
′. Thus, a query for the value of a bundle S only
tells us whether the valuation is vS or not. In the worst case, we have to query the value of every
bundle S for which |S| = |O| (except the “last” bundle) to determine O.
Now we fix the number of items m and the number of bidders n such that m/n = k and k is
an integer. We also fix a partition of the items (O1, ..., On), where |O1| = ... = |On| = k and the
valuation of each bidder i to vOi(·).
First we note that allocation (O1, ..., On) is the optimal allocation, with welfare m, because a
higher welfare is impossible, as each bidder values M for m/n.
Now we will prove that the valuations are (2 − ε)-stable. Notice that the allocation with the
second highest welfare has welfare m − 1: A welfare of m − 1/2 is not achievable as one bidder
would need to contribute k − 1/2 and all the others exactly k. To do that we would have to give
each bidder exactly k items and exactly one bidder would need to not take his optimal set. This
entails that a second bidder would also not get his optimal, thus making both bidders contribute
k − 1/2 to the total welfare.
Since the second best allocation has welfare m− 1 and every singleton value is 1, the maximum
value that the second highest allocation can achieve even with inflation for 1 item by γ is m− 1 +
(γ − 1) · 1. Thus the valuations are γ-stable if m > m− 1+ (γ − 1) · 1. This entails that γ can take
any value less 2.
Because of the structure of the valuations, finding the optimal allocation is hard. More specif-
ically, in the worst case allocating any bidder i his correct bundle Oi requires
(m
k
)
value queries.
This means that with less queries no bidder is going to get his optimal set. If no bidder gets his
optimal set the highest achievable welfare is guaranteed when all the bidders get k items. This
leads to an approximation ratio
n · (k − 1/2)
m
= 1−
1
2k
Thus we have proven that the inapproximability. Together with the submodularity and the
stability of the valuations, this concludes the proof. 
4 Existence of Walrasian Equilibrium
Similarly to [4, Theorem 4.2], we next show that combinatorial markets with 2-stable submodular
valuations admit a Walrasian Equilibrium.
Theorem 3. Let ~v be 2-stable submodular valuations. For every bidder i every item j ∈ Oi, let pj
be the price of that item for which: maxk 6=i vk(j) ≤ pj ≤ vi(j|Oi − j). Then, the prices p1, . . . , pm
form a Walrasian Equilibrium.
8
Proof. Fix a bidder i and his optimal bundle Oi. We note that the price pj of each item is well
defined. Because of Lemma 1, 2-stability, and j ∈ Oi, vi(j|Oi − j) > vk(j).
We next show that for any j 6∈ Oi, bidder i is not interested in getting j. Because of submodu-
larity, i’s additional utility due to item j is at most vi(j)− pj. Because j 6∈ Oi, pj ≥ vi(j), making
i’s utility from j non-positive. Hence, i’s demand is a subset of Oi.
To conclude the proof, we show that for any item j ∈ Oi, i gets non-negative utility due to
j. Fix a bundle S in the demand of bidder i with j 6∈ S. Note that we have already proven that
S ⊆ Oi. The utility gained by taking j is vi(j|S)− pj , which is non-negative; submodularity makes
vi(j|S) ≥ vi(j|Oi − j) ≥ pj . Hence, Oi is the demand of bidder i. 
We next show that Theorem 3 cannot be extended to stable XOS valuations. In the proof
of Theorem 3, 2-stability and submodularity ensure that the prices cannot exceed the marginal
increase vi(S|j) of adding an item j to some S ⊂ Oi. For XOS valuations, however, the marginals
vi(S|j) may not be increasing with S. As a result, the utility of a bidder i may be maximized by a
strict subset of his optimal bundle Oi. This is the core idea for the proof of the following lemma.
Lemma 2. For every γ ≥ 1, there exists a γ-stable valuations profile with a XOS bidder and a unit
demand bidder which does not admit a Walrasian Equilibrium.
Proof. Fix a value of γ and suppose there are m items, where m > γ + 2. The XOS bidder’s
valuation is simply a function of the carnality of his bundle:
v1(S) =


0, if |S| = 0
X, if 1 ≤ |S| ≤ m− 1
X + γ + 1, if |S| = m
where X is a very large positive value. It is easy to verify that the above valuation is indeed
monotone. To prove that it is also XOS we arbitrarily order the items M = {1, 2, ...,m} and use
the following m+ 1 additive functions
• For j ∈ [m], aj(·), values item j for X, and the rest of the items for 0, i.e. ∀S: aj(S) =
X · 1(j ∈ S).
• The (m+1)-th function, am+1(·), values every item for
X+γ+1
m , i.e. ∀S: am+1(S) =
X+γ+1
m |S|.
We now notice that v1(S) = maxk∈[m+1]
∑
t∈S ak(t). We should add that this holds only if the
value of X is large enough.
The unit-demand bidder values each item for 1: v2(S) = 1(|S| > 0). The optimal solution is to
give the whole bundle to the XOS bidder. If we endow the valuation of the unit-demand bidder by
γ for any item j, it would make it v′2(S) = max
(
1(|S| > 0), γ ·1(j ∈ S)
)
. Even if the unit demand
bidder had this valuation, then the optimal allocation still is to give the XOS bidder all the items,
making the valuations γ-stable.
Now we are going to prove that this instance does not admit a Walrasian Equilibrium. To do
that let us assume that there exist prices p1, .., pm that form a Walrasian Equilibrium. Denote
with j the item whose price is minimum, i.e. j ∈ argminj∈M pj. The XOS bidder’s utility for the
cheapest item should be at most his utility for the grand bundle:
X + γ + 1−
∑
t∈M
pt ≥ X − pj
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Mechanism 2: Extended Parallel 2nd Price Auction (EP2A)
Input: Value and demand query access to valuations ~v = (v1, . . . , vn).
For all bidders i and items j, query vi(j) and let bij denote the response.
Set the price pj of each item j to its second highest bid.
For each bidder i, let Si be the set of items for which i has the highest bid.
Bidder i receives his demand from Si, where each item has price pj.
Bidder i pays the total price for his demand from Si.
By reordering and using the fact that j has the minimum price we get
γ + 1 ≥ (m− 1)pj (3)
Now we also use the fact the the utility of the unit-demand bidder for taking item j should not
be strictly positive, since we have a WE
1− pj ≤ 0 (4)
By combining equations 3 and 4 we get γ + 1 ≥ m − 1. Due to our original assumption that
m > γ + 2, we get a contradiction which concludes the proof. 
5 Mechanism Design For Stable Combinatorial Auctions
In this section, we investigate truthful mechanism design for CAs with stable submodular valuations.
We should emphasize that despite Theorem 1, VCG cannot be used as a computationally efficient
DSIC mechanism for stable subadditive CAs, because the subinstances ~v−i, whose optimal solutions
determine the payments, may not be stable and may be NP-hard to solve optimally (e.g., adding
a bidder with additive valuation that has a huge value for each singleton to any CA results in a
stable instance).
We first present a truthful extension of Algorithm 1, which is implemented as a Parallel 2nd
Price Auction (P2A) and also uses a demand query for each bidder.
Theorem 4. Mechanism 2 uses nm value queries and n demand queries, and is DSIC for any CA
with subadditive valuations. Moreover, if the valuations profile ~v is 2-stable submodular, Mecha-
nism 2 returns the optimal allocation.
Proof. First, we show that Mechanism 2 is DSIC for subadditive bidders. We focus on the bidding
step, because assuming that each set Si is determined in a truthful way, it is always in each bidder’s
best interest to respond to his demand query truthfully.
We observe that no bidder has incentive to bid lower than his singleton value for an item.
Bidding lower could only lead to the bidder losing some items, thus restricting the set of items
available to him through his demand query. Moreover, no bidder has incentive to bid higher than
his singleton value for an item. This would only entail having access to an item that has price
at least his actual singleton value. However, because of subadditivity, the bidder does not include
such an item in his demand set.
The fact that Mechanism 2 computes an optimal allocation for 2-stable submodular valuations
is an immediate consequence of Theorem 1 and Theorem 3. 
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Mechanism 3: Parallel 2nd Price Auction(P2A)
Input: Value query access to valuations ~v = (v1, . . . , vn).
For all bidders i and items j, query vi(j) and let bij denote the response.
Set the price pj of each item j to its second highest bid.
For each bidder i, let Si be the set of items for which i has the highest bid.
Bidder i receives Si and pays
∑
j∈Si
pj .
Next, we show that a P2A (Mechanism 3), that uses only value queries, is ex-post incentive
compatible when restricted to 2-stable submodular valuations profiles. The proof of the following
is an immediate consequence of Theorem 3 and Theorem 1.
Theorem 5. Mechanism 3 uses nm value queries and is EPIC for any CA with 2-stable submodular
valuations. Moreover, under truthful bidding, Mechanism 3 computes the optimal allocation.
Proof. The number of value queries immediately comes from the mechanism’s description. The fact
that it finds the optimal allocation comes directly from theorem 1; the same bundles are allocated,
which was proven to be optimal even for subadditive bidders.
To prove that the mechanism is EPIC, we fix a bidder i, his valuation vi(·) and suppose that
any other bidder k bids his singleton value vk(j) for each item j ∈M . We need to prove that i has
nothing to gain if he bids untruthfully.
We will show this by contradiction. Suppose that imakes a different bid and ends up with higher
utility. In order to change his utility he must change either his allocated set or the payments. Since
the payments are independent of his bids, he must to be allocated a set S different than Oi. First
we prove that it must hold that S ⊆ Oi.
Let’s assume the opposite, that there exists a j for which j ∈ S and j /∈ Oi. Then i’s utility by
dropping j would decrease by V = vi(S) − vi(S − j), but it would increase by P = maxk 6=i vk(j).
Because j belongs to some Ok, by Lemma 1, and 2-stability P > vi(j). Also because of submodu-
larity, V < vi(j). This shows that i has strictly higher utility if he drops any items not in Oi. Now
we have to disprove that S ⊂ Oi.
By contradiction, suppose that there exists a j such that j ∈ Oi, but j /∈ S. Then i’s utility
by acquiring j would increase by V = vi(S ∪ j) − vi(S) and decrease by P = maxk 6=i vi(j). From
Lemma 1, we know that P < vi(S ∪ j) − vi(S), which means that bidder i gains strictly positive
utility by obtaining any item in Oi.
The theorem is now proven. We have shown that bidder i strictly loses utility from items outside
of Oi and strictly gains utility from items in Oi. 
Interestingly, Mechanism 3 is not DSIC even when restricted to submodular CAs. The reason is
that even the true bidder valuations profile may be 2-stable, their bids might be not. Hence, it may
happen that bidder k bids higher than his real singleton value on some item j, but j is allocated
to different bidder i. This may increase pj to a level that is no longer profitable for bidder i to get
item j (which is exactly the reason that we employ the demand queries in Mechanism 2).
The remark above naturally motivates the question about existence of a computationally effi-
cient DISC mechanism that computes the optimal allocation for 2-stable submodular CAs using
only value queries. Rather surprisingly, the following answers this question in the negative.
Theorem 6. Let A be any mechanism that is DSIC, uses only value queries and finds the optimal
solution for γ-stable submodular valuations, for some γ ≥ 1. Then A makes exponentially many
value queries.
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Proof. The proof is an interesting adaptation of the proof of [10, Theorem 3.1]. For the proof,
we use instances with just 2 bidders. Fixing one to be additive, the other may bid “stably” and
get any bundle. However, due to the structure of his true valuation, finding his demand may be
intractable, which makes misreporting a profitable strategy.
To reach a contradiction, we assume that A is DSIC, makes polynomially many value queries
and always finds the optimal solution for γ-stable submodular valuations, for some fixed γ ≥ 1.
First we establish the following, which helps determining whether a set of additive valuations is
stable.
Proposition 1. Let ~v be a profile with additive valuations. Then, for any γ ≥ 1, ~v is γ-stable if
for any item j ∈M , the largest value for j in ~v differs from the second largest value for j in ~v by a
factor larger than γ. Namely, if i = argmaxk∈[n]{vk(j)}, then vi(j) > γvk(j), for all bidders k 6= i.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proposition follows directly from the fact that endowing an additive
bidder k for an item j keeps him additive and inflates his singleton value by a factor of γ. 
For the rest of the proof, we consider 2 bidders and fix the valuation according to which bidder
1 makes his bids: v1(S) = |S|/m. v1(S) is not necessarily the true valuation of bidder 1. We fix
his true valuation to be also additive, with the value of each item large enough. This valuation,
together with any other bounded and submodular valuation, results in a valuations profile that is
submodular and stable (for a large enough stability factor).
We next prove that bidder 1 can get any bundle.
Proposition 2. For any bundle O, bidder 2 will be allocated O, if he bids according to
v2(S) = |S ∩O|+
|S −O|
m2
(5)
Proof of Proposition 2. First we fix any bundle O ⊆ M . By Proposition 1, valuations (v1, v2) are
(m − ε)-stable. Taking m large enough makes the valuations γ-stable. Given that they are also
additive, and thus submodular, we get that the mechanism A (which, by hypothesis, computes the
optimal allocation for γ-stable instances) allocates O to bidder 2. 
Next, we show that the prices set by A for bidder 2 are bounded and strictly increasing.
Proposition 3. For any bundle T and any S ⊆ T , it holds that
|T | − |S|
m2
≤ pT − pS ≤ |T | − |S| (6)
where pS and pT are the prices of bundles S and T assigned from A for bidder 2.
Proof of Proposition 3. We examine what happens when bidder 2 bids according to (5). First we
set O = T , which means that bidder 2 will receive T . Since A is DSIC, bidder 2 should not prefer
S over T , i.e., v2(T ) − pT ≥ v2(S) − pS. This implies the rhs of (6), because v2(T ) = |T | and
v2(S) = |S| (since S ⊆ T ).
The argument for the lhs of (6) is symmetric. We let bidder 2 bid according to (5), where
O = S. Then, bidder 2 should not prefer T over S, i.e., v2(S)− pS ≥ v2(T )− pT . Since v(S) = |S|
and v(T ) = m · |S|+ |T − S|/m2, we get the lhs of (6). 
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We also note that setting S = ∅ in (6), we get that |T |/m2 ≤ pT ≤ |T |.
We now create an exponentially large structured submenu, as in [10, Definition 3.2]. This
concludes the proof, since the existence of such a submenu entails that A requires exponentially
many value queries to find the demand of bidder 2, as shown in [10, Lemma 3.10]. For completeness,
we recall that a collection of bundles S comprises a structured submenu for bidder 2 if:
1. For all S ∈ S, bidder 2 can be allocated S.
2. For each S, T ∈ S: |S| = |T | and |pS − pT | ≤
1
m5
.
3. For all S, T ⊆M such that S ∈ S and S ⊂ T : pT − pS ≥
1
m3
.
4. For all S ∈ S: pS ≤ m.
Since bidder 2 can get any bundle, the first property is satisfied. Also by Proposition 3, the
third property is satisfied, because for any S ⊂ T : pT − pS > 1/m
3.
To create the structured submenu, we fix k = m/2 and consider all the
(
m
k
)
different bundles
of size k. Our submenu is a subset of those bundles, which immediately satisfies the first part of
the second property. Also since |T |/m2 ≤ pT ≤ |T |, the price of each bundle is at most k, which
implies the last property.
We need to show the last part of the second property. To this end, following the construction
of [10, Section 3.1], we split the interval [0,m] into m5 bins. For each bundle S of size k, we put
S in the i-th bin if pS ∈
[
i/m5, (i + 1)/m5
)
. Since there are m5 bins and
(m
k
)
bundles, one bin
must have exponentially many bundles. Let S be the set of bundles in such a bin. Notice that
the bundles of the same bin have prices which differ less 1/m5, thus satisfying the last part of the
second property.
This completes the proof that there is an exponentially large collection S of bundles that com-
prises a structured submenu. To conclude the proof, we apply [10, Lemma 3.10]. For completeness,
we include the technical details in Appendix A.1. 
A natural question is whether one could also follow the first part of the proof of [10, Theorem 3.1],
in order to get a much stronger inapproximability bound of m−1/2+ε, for any ε > 0. Unfortunately
the answer is negative, because the polar additive valuation profiles in [10, Section 3.1] are far from
stable. This explains the necessity of our careful construction of stable valuation profiles, in the
first part of the proof of Theorem 6.
6 Price of Anarchy in Stable Combinatorial Auctions
6.1 The Price of Anarchy in Parallel 2nd Price Auctions
For XOS valuations, the PoA of P2A is at least 1/2 [32]. We next show that even for (3− ε)-stable
valuations, the PoA of P2A does not improve.
Lemma 3. There exists a (3− ε)-stable profile with unit-demand valuations for which the PoA of
P2A is 1/2.
Proof. The instance in Example 1 is (3− ε)-stable and has been used to show that the PoA of P2A
is at most 1/2. More precisely, we observe that there is an equilibrium with social welfare 2: Alice
bids 0 for a and 1 for b and Bob bids 1 for a and 0 for b. 
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Interestingly, the previous result is tight. With 3-stable submodular valuations, every equilib-
rium is optimal. To prove this, we introduce a no-overbidding assumption, which is weaker than
the usual Strong No Overbidding assumption (where each bidder’s value for any bundle S is at
most the sum of his bids for S). We call our assumption Singleton No Overbidding (SiNO), as it
restricts the bids to be below each corresponding singleton value. We also note that the bidding
profile in Lemma 3 SiNO.
Definition 2 (Singleton No Overbidding). A bidding profile (~b1, ...,~bn) satisfies Singleton No Over-
bidding (SiNO) if for any bidder i and item j: vi(j) ≥ bij .
Now we are ready to prove that with SiNO, PoA is always 1 for CAs with 3-stable submodular
valuations.
Theorem 7. Let ~v be a 3-stable submodular valuations profile, and let ~b be a bidding profile that
forms a Pure Nash Equilibrium for P2A and satisfies SiNO. Then the allocation at the equilibrium
coincides with the optimal allocation.
Proof. We prove the theorem by contradiction. First, denote with wj the second highest singleton
valuation for item j, i.e. if j ∈ Oi, wj = maxk 6=i vk(j) (i has the highest singleton valuation for j,
by Lemma 1). Fix a bidder i who does not get allocated his optimal set, i.e. Oi 6= Si(~b). Let Ai be
the items that i is allocated at the equilibrium that are also in Oi, i.e. Ai = Oi ∩ Si(~b).
We construct a deviating bid for i: For items not in Oi, i bids 0. For items in Ai, i bids as
before (which means that the prices for these items will be the same as before). Finally for items
in Oi −Ai, i bids infinitesimally more than wj . Note that this bidding strategy conforms to SiNO.
Also because of SiNO, it guarantees that i receives the whole bundle Oi. His new utility is
u′i = vi(Oi)−
∑
j∈Ai
pj(~b)−
∑
j∈Oi−Ai
max
k 6=i
bkj ≥ vi(Oi)−
∑
j∈Ai
pj(~b)−
∑
j∈Oi−Ai
wj , (7)
where the inequality holds because of SiNO: Every bid must be below the corresponding singleton
value, which in turn is less than the maximum of the singleton values. Now we use that i’ utility
in (7) cannot be greater than i’s utility at the equilibrium (for brevity, we let Si(~b) = Si from that
point on). Hence, we obtain that:
vi(Si)−
∑
j∈Si
pj(~b) ≥ vi(Oi)−
∑
j∈Ai
pj(~b)−
∑
j∈Oi−Ai
wj (8)
In (8), we can eliminate the term
∑
j∈Ai
pj(~b), because it is included in the term
∑
j∈Si
pj(~b).
Also, we can ignore the rest of the prices in the lhs, as they are positive. Hence, we obtain that:
vi(Si) ≥ vi(Oi)−
∑
j∈Oi−Ai
wj (9)
Now using that wj ≥ vi(j), for items j ∈ Si−Ai, and submodularity, namely that
∑
j∈Si−Ai
vi(j)+
vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Si), and (9), we obtain the following:
∑
j∈Si−Ai
wj +
∑
j∈Oi−Ai
wj ≥ vi(Oi)− vi(Ai) (10)
Now because, by definition, both sets
⋃
i(Si − Ai) and
⋃
i(Oi − Ai) consist of the items that
were not optimally allocated (and only them), summing up (10) over all bidders i, we get that:
2
∑
i
∑
j∈Oi−Ai
wj ≥
∑
i
(
vi(Oi)− vi(Ai)
)
(11)
14
Because of Lemma 1 and 3-stability, for any item j ∈ Oi, we have that vi(j|Oi − j) >
1
2wj .
Then, using (11), we obtain the following:
∑
i
∑
j∈Oi−Ai
(
vi(Oi)− vi(Oi − j)
)
>
∑
i
(
vi(Oi)− vi(Ai)
)
(12)
For every i, it holds that
∑
j∈Oi−Ai
(
vi(Oi) − vi(Oi − j)
)
≤ vi(Oi) − vi(Ai), which contradicts
(12). The latter inequality is true because of submodularity. More specifically, we can index items
in Oi−Ai as 1, 2, 3, . . . , |Oi−Ai| and denote Xj = {1, 2, ..., j}, with X0 = ∅ and X|Oi−Ai| = Oi−Ai.
Hence, we obtain that:
vi(Oi)− vi(Ai) =
|Oi−Ai|∑
j=1
(
vi(Oi −Xj−1)− vi(Oi −Xj)
)
(13)
Due to submodularity, vi(Oi −Xj−1)− vi(Oi −Xj) ≥ vi(Oi)− vi(Oi − j). This and (13) imply
that
∑
j∈Oi−Ai
(
vi(Oi)−vi(Oi−j)
)
≤ vi(Oi)−vi(Ai), which concludes the proof of the theorem. 
We proceed to study the PoA of P2A for the more general class of XOS valuations. For general
XOS valuations, the PoA is at least 1/2, which cannot be improved for (3−ε)-stable XOS valuations,
due to Lemma 3. We show that as valuations become more stable, the PoA improves.
Theorem 8. For any γ ≥ 2, let ~v be a γ-stable profile with XOS valuations. Let ~b be a bidding
profile that forms a Pure Nash Equilibrium for P2A and satisfies SiNO. Then the PoA is larger
than γ−2γ−1 .
The intuition is similar to that in the proof of Theorem 7. Even if the prices are as high as
possible, as γ gets larger, each bidder has more incentive to prefer the items in his optimal bundle
than any other items.
Proof. Fix the optimal allocation (O1, ..., On) and a bidder i. Let qi(·) be the supporting additive
valuation for bidder i for set Oi: ∀S, vi(S) ≥
∑
j∈S qi(j) and vi(Oi) =
∑
j∈Oi
qi(j). We have bidder
i deviate and bid according to ~b∗i : he bids 0 for items not in Oi, and for j ∈ Oi he bids qi(j).
Because of SiNO (vk(j) ≥ bkj) and Lemma 1 (qi(j) > (γ−1)·maxk 6=i vk(j)), bidder is guaranteed
to obtain the whole bundle Oi. Because ~b is a Nash Equilibrium it holds that
ui(Si(~b)) ≥ ui(Si(~b∗i ,
~b−i)) = vi(Oi)−
∑
j∈Oi
max
k 6=i
(bkj) (14)
Since prices are non-negative, lhs in (14) is at most vi(Si(~b)) and because of SiNO bkj ≤ vk(j).
Also because of Lemma 1: (γ − 1) · vk(j) < qi(j). Combining all the above in inequality (14) gives:
vi(Si(~b)) > vi(Oi)−
1
γ − 1
∑
j∈Oi
qi(j) =
γ − 2
γ − 1
vi(Oi) (15)
Summing inequality (15) for all i gives us the lemma and completes the proof. 
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6.2 The Price of Anarchy in Parallel 1st Price Auctions
We conclude with a lower bound on the PoA of Parallel 1st Price Auctions (P1A) for CAs with
stable valuations. If bidders are restricted to a mixed Nash equilibrium, the PoA of P1A for
bidders with XOS valuations is at least 1 − 1e . Similarly to Theorem 8, we show that the PoA of
P1A increases, as the stability of a XOS valuations profile increases.
Theorem 9. For any γ ≥ 2, let ~v be a γ-stable profile with XOS valuations. Let ~b be a bidding
profile that forms a Mixed Nash Equilibrium for P1A. Then the PoA is larger than γ−2γ−1 .
For the proof, we observe that as the stability factor γ increases, the valuation of a bidder i for
each item j in his optimal bundle becomes considerably larger than the second highest singleton
valuation for item j. Hence, if bidder i bids the second highest singleton valuation for each item
in his optimal bundle, i’s utility should be large enough to establish that the allocation of the
equilibrium achieves a large enough social welfare.
Before proving Theorem 9, we need to prove a technical proposition. Because in stable auctions
the singleton values of the bidders are very important, we would like to prove that in a P1A, no
bidder bids higher than his singleton value, like in SiNO. However this is not the case. One can
consider a simple example with 2 bidders and 1 item. The first bidder has value 1 and the second
2. A pure equilibrium is for the first bidder to bid 1.5 and the second bidder to bid 1.5 + ε.
Since bids can be above singleton values, we are going to prove something similar: A bidder
bids higher that his singleton value, only if he is sure that he is not going to receive that item.
Proposition 4. Let ~v be subadditive valuations and ~D = (D1, ...,Dn) a profile of bid vector distri-
butions that forms a MNE for P1A. Then for every j and i:
If Pr
~b∼ ~D
[j ∈ Si(~b)] > 0, then max
~bi∼Di
(bij) ≤ vi(j)
Proposition 4 states that if a bidder gets a certain item with positive probability, then he always
bids at most his singleton value for that item. The proof is quite easy, since paying for an item
more than the corresponding singleton value, decrease the utility.
Proof of Proposition 4. Fix a bidder i and an item j. We will show this by contradiction: Suppose
that at some realization of Di bidder i bids higher than vi(j) for item j and that at some other
realization of ~D bidder i gets item j. Since the distributions in ~D are independent, this means that
there exists a realization of ~D where bidder i both gets j and bids for it higher than vi(j). Now we
need to show that if bidder i lowered his bid to vi(j) he would gain utility.
In the realizations where i bids high for j and he does not get j, he has nothing to lose by
lowering his price.
In the realizations where i bids high for j and gets j, if he lowered his price to vi(j) he would
either lose the item, yielding a utility increase of bij − vi(j|S − j) or he would simple pay less,
increasing his utility by bij − vi(j). Both quantities are strictly positive, the first because of
subadditivity (vi(j|S − j) < vi(j)). This means that ~D is not a MNE, which completes the
contradiction. 
Having proven Proposition 4, we are ready to show our main result for stable P1A. From now
on we are going to denote with wj the maximum of the singleton values of the bidders that do not
get item j at the optimal allocation, i.e. if j ∈ Oi, then wj = maxk 6=i vk(j).
Proof of Theorem 9. Fix a bidder i. We are going to construct a deviating bid for him. First bid 0
for any items not in Oi. Denote with A the subset of Oi that i gets with probability 1 at the MNE.
For the items in A, he keeps the same bidding strategy and for the other items j ∈ Oi −A he bids
infinitesimally more than wj , i.e. maxk 6=i vk(j). This bidding strategy gets i the whole bundle Oi.
This is obvious for items in A. For items j ∈ Oi−A, player i only needs to outbid any other player
k that has positive probability to get j. Because of Proposition 4 their bid is at most wj, which
means that our deviating bids achieve getting these items from them.
Before using our deviating bid, let us analyze the expected payment of i at the equilibrium:
E
~b∼ ~D
∑
j∈Si(~b)
pj(~b) = E
~b∼ ~D
∑
j∈Si(~b)−A
pj(~b) + E
~b∼ ~D
∑
j∈A
pj(~b) ≥ E
~b∼ ~D
∑
j∈A
pj(~b) (16)
Where the equality holds because for every realization of bids ~b, A ⊆ Si(~b) and the inequality
because the payments are always non-negative. Now we use the fact that if i uses the deviating
bids, he is not going to lose any utility. For the payment at the equilibrium we use (16) as it is a
lower bound for the real payment of i
E
~b∼ ~D
vi(Si(~b))− E
~b∼ ~D
∑
j∈A
pj(~b) ≥ vi(Oi)−
∑
j∈Oi−A
wj − E
~b∼~D
∑
j∈A
pj(~b) (17)
Now by rearranging and using Lemma 1 (wj <
1
γ−1qi(j)) we get
E
~b∼ ~D
vi(Si(~b)) > vi(Oi)−
1
γ − 1
∑
j∈Oi−A
qi(j) ≥ vi(Oi)−
1
γ − 1
∑
j∈Oi
qi(j) (18)
Where in the second inequality we simply make the sum contain more positive terms. Using
now the fact that vi(Oi) =
∑
j∈Oi
qi(j) and by adding eq. (18) for all i, we complete the proof of
the theorem. 
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A Appendix
A.1 Technical Details Missing from the Proof of Theorem 6
In this section, we complete the proof of Theorem 6, working along the lines of the proof of [10,
Lemma 3.10]. We have already showed that there exist a structured submenu of exponential size
with the following properties:
1. For all S ∈ S, bidder 2 can be allocated S.
2. For each S, T ∈ S: |pS − pT | ≤
1
m5
.
3. For all S, T ⊆M such that S ∈ S, S ⊂ T : pT − pS ≥
1
m3
.
4. For all S ∈ S: pS ≤ m.
5. For each S, T ∈ S: |S| = |T |.
With this submenu, we are ready to create a valuation where it is a hard to find the demand
bundle. Given a set O ∈ S, we use, as in the proof of [10, Lemma 3.10], the following valuation
function:
vO(S) =


t · |S|, if |S| < k
t · k − 1/m4, if S ∈ S and S 6= O
t · k, if S = O or ∃T ∈ S s.t. T ⊂ S
t · (k − 1
2m−|S|
), otherwise
(19)
where t is a large number whose value we will set later. To establish the submodularity of vO, we
show that for any S ⊂ T and j /∈ T , we have that 0 ≤ v(S ∪ j) − v(S) ≥ v(T ∪ j) − v(T ). Since
each marginal is at most t, any case where v(S ∪ j)− v(S) = t is trivial. Now we notice:
• If S∪j ∈ S, then v(S∪j)−v(S) ≥ t−1/m4. However the value of the marginal v(T ∪j)−v(T )
is one of the following:
– 1/m4, if T ∈ S − {O}.
– 0, if T = O.
– t
2m−|T |
, if both v(T ) and v(T ∪ j) are calculated by the 4th case of the valuation.
– t
2m−|T |
, if v(T ) is calculated by the 4th case of the valuation and v(T ∪ j) is calculated
by the 3rd case of the valuation.
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Because |T | < m, in all cases t− 1/m4 is greater for a large enough t, e.g. t > 2m.
• If ∃S′ ∈ S s.t. S′ ⊂ S, then v(S ∪ j)− v(S) = v(T ∪ j)− v(T ) = 0.
• If v(S) = t · (k − 1
2m−|S|
), then v(S ∪ j) − v(S) = t
2m−|S|
. Because S ⊆ T , the value of
v(T ∪ j)− v(T ) is either going to be 0 or t
2m−|T |
. In any case the marginal of S is greater.
Thus we see that in any case the marginal of S is both positive and greater than the marginal
of T . This proves the submodularity and monotonicity.
Now we notice that finding bundle O by doing value queries in vO(·) is hard: it requires |S| − 1
queries. This is because for any O′ ∈ S distinguishing between vO(·) and vO
′
(·) requires querying
either O or O′, which in the worst case requires querying almost every bundle in S. Since A does
polynomially many value queries, bidder 2 will not be allocated bundle O, since the size of S is
exponential.
Now all that is left to do is to prove is that if bidder 2, who can pick any set S at price pS , has
valuation vO(·), then he strictly demands O. To this end, we need to prove the following inequality
(see also [10, Claim 3.13]):
vO(O)− pO > v
O(S)− pS (20)
for any S 6= O. We examine the following cases:
• If |S| < k then v(S) = t·|S|. Manipulating inequality 20 leads to proving t·(k−|S|) > pO−pS .
The lhs is at least t (since |S| ≤ k−1) and the rhs is at most m (because of submenu property
4 and pS ≥ 0). Since t is as large as we want it to be, it holds that t > m.
• If S ∈ S then inequality 20 becomes 1/m4 > pO − pS . This indeed holds because of submenu
property 2.
• If O ⊂ S, then v(S) = v(O). However because of submenu property 3, the price of S is
greater than O’s. This makes it have strictly less utility.
• If ∃T ∈ S s.t. T ⊂ S (T 6= O), then v(S) = v(T ) + 1/m4 and also pS ≥ pT +1/m
3 (submenu
property 3). This makes S at less favorable than T . However T already has less utility than
O because of the second bullet.
• If v(S) = t · (k − 1
2m−|S|
), then inequality 20 becomes t
2m−|S|
> pO − pS . This holds because
we can take t as large as we want, making the LHS as large as we want, while at the same
time the RHS is at most m (because of submenu property 4 and pS ≥ 0).
Thus we have proven (20), for every S 6= O. This makes bidder 2 strictly demand the bundle O.
However the mechanism cannot allocate that bundle with polynomially many queries. This entails
that the best strategy for bidder 2 is to bid untruthfully, e.g. bidding according to v(S) = |S ∩O|.
This makes A not DSIC which leads to a contradiction and completes the proof.
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